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Abstract 
We propose to enhance the security and transparency of aircraft maintenance records in 
the aviation industry through the use of blockchain technology. A physical aircraft 
maintenance logbook is susceptible to being lost or destroyed. A nonexistent aircraft 
maintenance logbook hurts the confidence in integrity and reputation of the aircraft. 
Furthermore, fraud can occur through forgery of FAA personnel signatures and the 
installation of non-official aircraft parts. The scope of this work is to develop a secure 
blockchain that can store aircraft service records and information in a digital distributed 
ledger. By keeping the maintenance logbook on a digital ledger, records can be stored 
indefinitely in a trusted environment with the integrity of records guaranteed. 
Additionally, to achieve being a distributed ledger, a consensus algorithm PoET is used 
to display the global state accurately to all users. The SAMR blockchain uses the Linux 
Foundations open sourced software “Hyperledger” to facilitate an environment that 
mimics a real-world implementation. The Python Programming Language was used for 
SAMR's implementation of the blockchain logic through creation of a permission-based 
blockchain for holding the maintenance records. 
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Chapter 1  
1.0 Introduction 
Aircraft maintenance records are often an afterthought for many aircraft owners, however 
keeping accurate records is a critical procedure in maintaining an aircraft’s airworthiness. 
Currently, aircraft maintenance log books are stored in a physical ledger located in the 
aircraft or in the owner’s possession. A major risk associated with maintaining a physical 
logbook is to be lost or stolen, which will render the aircraft unairworthy (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2017). 
While the aircraft may be in perfect shape to fly, it is not airworthy under the FAA rules 
(CFR part 43) without the ledger showing that proper maintenance has been completed. If 
the log book is lost, the aircraft owner will have to reconstruct it from scratch, which 
increases in difficulty as the aircraft gets older. Reconstructing the maintenance history of 
an aircraft is extremely expensive and time consuming and often requires additional 
documents to satisfy the FAA requirements. To begin the reconstruction of maintenance 
logs, FAA rules (AC 43-9C) advises referencing other records that reflect the time in 
service, research records maintained by repair facilities, and reference records maintained 
by individual mechanics (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). As the aircraft 
becomes older, repair facilities and mechanics may no longer be in business or hold the 
recorded log of events for the aircraft any more. If certain record parts are still not able to 
be reconstructed, an aircraft owner will need to make a notarized statement in the new 
record describing the loss and establishing the time in service based on the research and 
the best estimate of time in service (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). 
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Additionally, at the time of sale of the aircraft, a lost maintenance log book can affect the 
resale value by as much as 50% as stated by various aviation insurance companies (H. 
Chappell, n.d.). Even if notarized statements have been made, potential customers are 
skeptical about buying an aircraft without the original documents. An aircraft buyer will 
typically look at the following items in a maintenance logbook to ensure compliance and 
aircraft continuity (A. Vasseur-Browne, 2018). 
1. The aircraft’s total maintenance history. 
2. Total airframe, engine, and propeller time. 
3. Compliance with airworthiness directives (AD). 
If the aircraft’s maintenance logbooks do not demonstrate compliance or continuity, the 
buyer of the aircraft would need to purchase it at a lower cost to cover the cost of 
reconstructing the records. 
With a physical logbook, the falsification of maintenance records is also inherently 
possible through the forgery of signatures of an FAA inspection authority. While rare, the 
FAA takes a strict stance to ensure the integrity of aircraft maintenance records by 
prosecuting those responsible. The FAA is warranted to act in such a manner to avoid 
falsification of maintenance information for any reason, since it is pertinent to aviation 
safety. The FAA 14 CFR 43.12 title prohibits the falsification, reproduction, or alteration 
of maintenance records. Any operator found in violation of the title would have their 
certificate suspended or revoked.  
The goal of this thesis is to address the flaws of using a physical aircraft maintenance log 
book by creating a secure and transparent blockchain ledger that will hold Aviation 
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Maintenance Records. The FAA has strict guidelines and regulations on when aircraft 
owners and operators should record any maintenance done on the aircraft but does not 
mandate the form of which they can be stored. The proposed method in this thesis is to 
develop a computationally secure blockchain to store aircraft records indefinitely, 
transparently, and securely. 
The blockchain runs off a global collaboration opensource project hosted by the Linux 
Foundation named Hyperledger. Hyperledger, at the time of this writing, is currently 
working on eight different blockchain technology projects that differ in their intended 
uses ("Introduction -  Sawtooth", 2018). Project Sawtooth, under the umbrella of the 
Hyperledger, was selected to be the development environment for the blockchain because 
of its ability to provide security and auditability. The blockchain developed in this thesis 
uses a distributed ledger data structure to allow all participants and authorized parties to 
view the same information which is important to promote reliability, transparency, 
flexibility, and FAA compliance, characteristics defined below: 
 Reliability: Refers to the ability of the blockchain to sustain information in the 
event of a crash or potential attack by distributing its ledger on multiple nodes 
around the world. 
 Transparency: The FAA, NTSB, and aircraft owners can benefit from being able 
to see the complete history of an aircraft with proper authorization and consensus 
among parties. 
 Flexibility: The modular capabilities of the blockchain allow it to remain 
sustainable in the ever-evolving aviation and high technology industry. 
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 Compliance: Current FAA Requirements outlined in CFR part 43 and 91 are 
complied with, making blockchain a valid choice for replacing the physical 
maintenance record logbook. 
To achieve these blockchain benefits, three basic components of a distributed ledger are 
used, namely a data model, language of transactions, and a protocol ("Introduction -  
Sawtooth", 2018). The data model used is a Radix Merkle Tree on an addressable 35-byte 
block used to store large amounts of records. The Python programming language is then 
used to change the state of the ledger under parameters set on transactions (new entries). 
Finally, Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) is the chosen protocol used to provide consensus 
and ensure all data are presented correctly in the blockchain.  
This thesis will focus on the physical recording of aircraft maintenance including parts, 
inspections, and services in the private aviation industry. The commercial industry is 
subject to additional regulations by the FAA, along with practices that differ between all 
flight operations. The blockchain will adhere to all current FAA regulations that outline 
retention requirements for maintenance record logbooks. In addition to the new 
blockchain, a simulation has been developed to highlight a real-world scenario. 
With blockchain technology being used in the financial industry to record transaction 
data, there is an opportunity to store entire records instead. Moving aircraft maintenance 
records to a secure digital solution can help with many issues that aircraft owners face 
trying to preserve the physical logbook. Using the ideology of Haber and Stornetta, along 
with the proven track record of cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, this thesis proposes a new 
solution for the aviation industry to continue its advancement in technology.   
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Chapter 2  
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 FAA Approval 
While the scope of this thesis does not involve getting FAA approval to use the 
blockchain, it is important to note current application and use cases. The FAA has 
outlined an entire section on the requirements of aircraft maintenance records in Advisory 
Circular 43-9C (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). FAA uses Advisory Circulars 
(AC) to provide guidance on methods, procedures and practices that they have 
determined to meet their compliance and regulations. AC 43-9C specifically “shows 
acceptable means of compliance with the General Aviation (GA) maintenance record-
making and recordkeeping requirements of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(14 CFR) parts 43 and 91” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). While AC 43-9C 
shows guidance on how to achieve proper practices, mandatory requirements are set forth 
in 14 CFR parts 43 and 91. 
Title14 CFR parts 43 and 91 of FAA regulations stipulate that several conditions must be 
met before a plane is eligible to fly again after service has been conducted. The most 
important regulation is that aircraft maintenance records must be updated and maintained 
to achieve airworthiness on the aircraft. When an aircraft is taken in for service, whether 
it be a routine inspection or major engine overhaul, all information must be logged by the 
mechanic for future reference (Federal Aviation Administration, 2017). Categories that 
must be filled out include a description of the duties conducted by the mechanic, the date 
in which maintenance was carried out, and the required certificate number and signature 
of the individuals responsible for the service. 
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Retention requirements as outlined by the FAA in CFR section 91.417(a) sets how 
aircraft maintenance records must be stored. “Maintenance records may be kept in any 
format that provides record continuity; includes required contents; lends itself to the 
addition of new entries; provides for signature entry; and, is intelligible” (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2017). The blockchain technology solution approach proposed 
in this thesis conforms and meets all FAA requirements set forth in FAA’s publications. 
Continuity of the records is achieved by using a distributed ledger where information is 
stored on nodes across the permission based network. Each node has access to the 
information on the permission based peer-to-peer system, which would be 
computationally impractical to bring down all at once. Nevertheless, backups of the 
blockchain states are routinely stored on servers in an unlikely scenario. Large amounts 
of data that come with aviation maintenance records can then be stored on the blockchain 
with all required contents. The data is serialized into a format which can be stored in a 
block and then able to be displayed again when the block is called. An identical digital 
formatted form is presented to the user to fill all attributes of a physical maintenance 
record which can then be uploaded for verification and entry into the blockchain. Entry of 
additional maintenance records and modification to any verified record can also be 
achieved through consensus on the blockchain. Multiple authorized users such as the 
aircraft owner, mechanic or aircraft operator can request and change information on the 
blockchain. Changes to the ledger are recorded and previous entries are indefinitely 
displayed and shown along with the new entry. Finally, the blockchain combined with a 
distributed ledger data format is intelligible enough to be used in a real-world setting. 
 
 
8 
 
With the requirements met, this blockchain could potentially be used in real world 
scenarios with proper approval. 
2.2 Development Platform  
The blockchain space is becoming more widely adopted with many development projects 
currently under way. This thesis uses a blockchain development platformed named 
Hyperledger to create a new method to store Aviation Maintenance records. Hyperledger 
has been in development since 2015 and was started by the Linux foundation to promote 
open source blockchain solutions ("Introduction -  Sawtooth", 2018). In Hyperledger, a 
specific project was also chosen to start development on because of its enterprise 
focusing attributes. Named Sawtooth, this umbrella open source blockchain project will 
assist in the development of a blockchain that can meet the FAA requirements. 
2.3 Current and Future Competitive Product Offerings 
Existing market options include digital record storage, purchasing insurance, and one 
potential startup company. Multiple websites offer to digitize aircraft owners’ 
maintenance records and create backups on their internal servers including NBAA 
member Planelogix.com. The website offers a “premium” user experience and 
transparency in their payment process. Owners can either scan the pages themselves or 
ship the entire physical maintenance logbook to their processing facility. No information 
on how the maintenance records are stored is provided on the website. An attempt was 
made to reach out to the company but yielded no response. Software also exists, such as 
V-Log Aircraft Digital Records Management, which aircraft owners and operators can 
use to store in their cloud hosted digital portal. Once again, the company does not specify 
what measures or protocols are followed to achieve security for their customers. 
 
 
9 
 
Blockchain goes above and beyond digital traditional storage methods like Planelogix 
and V-Log by not having to rely on centralized servers to store data. Servers and cloud 
storage units can be hacked, and records stolen or lost, if not maintained properly. With a 
blockchain, all records are stored on nodes across the world and the state of the system 
will be retained in an unlikely event of a world crash. Furthermore, blockchain has been 
proven computationally secure and cannot be changed without the state of the system 
being approved and noticed (Nakamoto, 2009). 
Insurance coverage can be purchased by aircraft owners to cover the reconstruction of the 
history of the aircraft at a premium price from insurance companies. Many aircraft 
owners forgo this offering because of its immense expense leaving them open to any cost 
and time associate with reconstruction. While the cost of reconstructing the records can 
be recovered, the time and depreciation on the aircraft from not having the original 
logbook will remain an issue. A blockchain could solve this issue by being indefinitely 
online and, in this case, easily accessible. 
Aeron is a startup company that is creating blockchain technology for the aviation 
industry with a roadmap that completes its offerings in 2019. They conducted a 
successful Initial Coin Offering (ICO) worth $15 Million, in October of 2017, to fund 
their development and marketing ("Aeron - Blockchain for Aviation Safety", 2018). 
There is no other information available in the surveyed whitepaper about the technology 
created in their blockchain. The only technology information presented is that it will be 
created on the Ethereum network and no public code is available. The development of 
this thesis is done on the Hyperledger Sawtooth platform, which differs from Ethereum in 
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many ways. The protocols used, and code are different and will not interfere with each 
other’s works. 
2.4 Literature Review Gaps 
The new methods presented in this thesis defer from all available methods to store 
aviation maintenance records. A blockchain application for Aviation Maintenance 
Records created on the Hyperledger network has not been attempted before and Aeron is 
not seen as an immediate competitor due to their roadmap. Development on this 
blockchain includes coding the proper protocols and front-end form required to fulfill all 
FAA requirements on the storage and retention of Aviation Maintenance Records. 
Hyperledger provides a framework with potential protocols to follow, but the ultimate 
development of an application and its own blockchain will be covered in this thesis. 
This thesis uses the algorithmic techniques that bitcoin originally brought together to 
transform a transaction-based ledger to a larger data structure. While distributed ledgers 
existed prior to bitcoin, the bitcoin blockchain marks the convergence of a host of 
technologies, including timestamping of transactions, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, 
cryptography, and shared computational power, along with a new consensus algorithm 
("Introduction -  Sawtooth", 2018). 
The differences between Bitcoin and the blockchain being developed in this thesis 
include data type, use cases, and consensus methods. Bitcoin stores financial transaction 
data that includes the addresses of the receiver and sender using a Merkle Tree. The 
blockchain in this thesis stores data in a ledger format in a Radix Merkle Tree that 
serializes the data. Storing data in the form of aviation maintenance records is more 
complex and different then storing transactional data. In addition to the data type, Bitcoin 
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was also designed to be decentralized currency used in direct competition with trust-
based banking. Hyperledger on the other hand focuses on enterprise ready blockchains 
that can store various data types including Aviation Maintenance Records 
Setting permissions in both blockchains are both different as Bitcoin is permission-less 
for anyone to use, while the blockchain in this thesis is permission-based. With Bitcoins 
blockchain, anyone and everyone has access to submit and view transactions. While the 
transaction addresses are hashed in such a way that the owners cannot be identified 
easily, it is still a security concern in an enterprise-based system. Being permission-based 
is essential in an enterprise system to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of 
information which is where these two blockchains differ significantly. An aircraft hangar 
that stores its own blockchain would not want records open to the public due to liability 
issues. Use cases for both blockchains are different, with Bitcoin appealing to everyone, 
while the blockchain presented in this thesis is permission based and only viewable to 
relevant actors. 
Finally, consensus methods of both blockchains differ. Bitcoin uses a Proof of Work 
algorithm, while the blockchain presented in this thesis uses Proof of Elapsed Time. At a 
high level, both blockchains use different algorithms to guarantee the information in the 
blockchain is accurate. A more technical explanation of both consensus methods is 
presented in the next section. 
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Chapter 3 
3.0 Methodology 
This section explains the technical requirements that must be achieved to conform to all 
FAA standards along with the blockchain technology used. The history of blockchain 
through its lifecycle will be examined along with a current use case (Bitcoin). The 
security of the blockchain will then be discussed which include data integrity, access 
control, and the threat model. Finally, the development section is broken down into 
introductory concepts, development lifecycle, and a simulation. 
3.1 Blockchain Background 
The idea of a blockchain has been around since 1991 when Stuart Haber and W. Scott 
Stornetta first used Merkle trees to be able to efficiently store several documents into one 
block (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). Their idea started with the problem of having to time-
stamp scientific data in a notebook which would then have to be stamped by a notary and 
then verified by a company manager. If any research or experiment had to be defended, 
the notebook which is vulnerable in its physical form would then have to be presented 
with the proper documentation (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). This process was tiresome and 
presented a challenge for researches to keep their logs throughout their lifetime, if any 
part of their claim was disputed. At the time, the only methods to timestamp a document 
were to mail themselves a letter on an earlier date and leave it unopened or handling 
records with more than one person present to defend the idea. 
Haber and Stornetta wanted to create a digital method to timestamp documents with two 
integrity promoting properties. The first property was “to time-stamp the data itself, 
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without any reliance on the characteristics of the medium on which the data appears, so 
that it is impossible to change even one bit of the document without the change being 
apparent” (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). In other words, the first property needs to ensure 
that the data cannot be changed on any device without it showing that it was tampered 
with. The second property states that “it should be impossible to stamp a document with a 
time and date different from the actual one” (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). This property 
ensures that the timestamp cannot be reversed and remain in place during the life of the 
block. The two researches then came up with an ingenious way to solve the timestamping 
issue by proposing a mathematically sound and computationally practical solution to the 
problem.  
Their solution was to use blocks of data that are linked together by the previous blocks 
hash. The linked blocks make the previous and future blocks dependent on each other 
which guarantees integrity. To guarantee the integrity, one-way hash functions were used 
in place of a digital signature. This integrity solves the issue of tampering, as it will show 
if the previous block has been modified by comparing the previous hash value. The 
benefit of using such a system at the time was for documents to establish “precedence of 
intellectual property without disclosing its contents” (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). It 
allowed for someone to lay claim to their invention without having to keep a physical 
record book that was verified and stamped by a second person. At the time, they referred 
to their invention as linked digital time stamping. Developed out of Haber and Stronettas 
research, Bitcoin came out in 2008 to be the first to use the idea of linked digital time 
stamping in a ledger format. 
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The blockchain idea was then first used by an anonymous person or group that calls 
themselves Satoshi Nakamoto in a paper title “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System (Nakamoto, 2009). The true identity of the creator of Bitcoin is still unknown 
with many speculating that it was a group of individuals rather than a single person 
(Nakamoto, 2009). The paper was published in 2008 launching www.bitcoin.org which 
laid out a plan to create a “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash to allow online 
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial 
institution” (Nakamoto, 2009). Using the ideas and philosophy of Haber and Stornetta, 
Satoshi Nakamoto designed the peer-to-peer network around digital signatures and a 
linked hash chain. Satoshi argues in his paper that using a trust-based model suffers from 
weaknesses because transactions can be reversed through mediation. Mediation is a 
problem because “it increases transaction cost limiting the minimum practical transaction 
size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader 
cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non-reversible services” 
(Nakamoto, 2009). In other words, the argument is that a trust-based system gives 
uncertainties and requires more information to ensure that the payments are agreed upon 
by both parties. 
To solve the inherent problem of a trust-based banking system, they designed an 
electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust. The 
cryptographic proof “allows two willing parties to transact directly with each other 
without the need for a trusted third party” (Nakamoto, 2009). The resulting transactions 
would be protected from the weaknesses that trust banking has, such as fraud, and would 
protect sellers more than the traditional system. To develop a payment system based on 
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cryptographic proof, Bitcoin created an electronic coin that was transferred through the 
use of digital signatures. In Satoshi Nakamotos words “each owner transfers the coin to 
the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the 
next owner and adding these to the end of the coin”. A visual representation of the 
transaction process is found below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Transactions in the Bitcoin Network (From Bitcoin.org) 
Another large problem that bitcoin had to overcome was the “double spending issue” 
where the same amount of money was spent more than once (Nakamoto, 2009). This 
issue stems from not waiting for confirmation from both parties and allowed fraud to pass 
through the system. To solve it, Bitcoin relies on the peer-to-peer distributed timestamp 
server to “generate computation proof of the chronological order of transactions 
(Nakamoto, 2009). The timestamp verifies that a transaction had to have had occurred 
because the data was hashed. A visual representation of the timestamp hash is shown in 
Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2: Timestamp server hash example (From bitcoin.org) 
The incentive to host nodes and complete transactions with a peer-to-peer system is a 
consensus method called Proof of Work. The Proof of Work system is based off 
Hashcash, which was developed first by Adam Back in 1997 (Back, 1997). Hashcash was 
originally developed for anti-denial of service and to stop email spam that came from 
network abuse (Back, 1997). By using Hashcashs’ algorithm for the core of Bitcoins 
mining process, Proof of Work is easily verifiable but hard to produce by the miners. To 
produce a new block, miners must “mine” all the data in a block to create a new block, 
which then confirms all transactions in that block. Nodes then confirm transactions and 
compete against each other in a process that is called mining. Using the computational 
power of the nodes computer, mathematical formulas are solved to confirm the 
transaction and verify the new blocks. The blocks are then added to the blockchain and 
are irreversible because new transaction blocks are added using the hash value of the 
previous block. The cost in Proof of Work from confirming the transactions is the 
electricity used by the CPU of the miner. 
3.2 Alternative Blockchain Consensus Algorithms  
Consensus algorithms are necessary in a blockchain to ensure that all nodes have the 
same data of the global state at any given time. They must all be Byzantine Fault-
Tolerant by design to ensure that no components of the system fail to correctly update all 
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nodes on the global state. They must also solve a computational scenario called the 
Byzantine Generals Problem. The Byzantine Generals problem was published in 1982 
which used an abstract example to demonstrate how a “reliable computer system must 
handle malfunctioning components that give conflicting information to different parts of 
the system” (Lamport, Shostak & Pease, 1982). The abstract scenario presented in the 
paper is a group of generals that must agree on a battle plan but can only communicate by 
messenger. The catch is that one or more could potentially be traitors and ruin the plan. 
Related to computer science, the Byzantine Generals Problem means that the components 
of the system must not fail because of a lack of communication. To solve this dilemma, 
consensus algorithms were developed to ensure proper communication between the 
components. 
Proof of Work was the first consensus algorithm to be implemented in a blockchain, but 
it does not come without its faults. Bitcoin suffers from being the first in the market and 
has inherent flaws from not being able to have predicted its rapid growth. Among those 
issues are the electricity that is needed to run the Proof of Work algorithms. Many miners 
sell their reward after completing confirmations which consequently drive the price of the 
cryptocurrency down. To solve this issue, alternative blockchain consensus algorithms 
have been developed over the years to solve various issues with Bitcoin. 
Alternative consensus algorithms that have been developed include Proof of Stake, Proof 
of Activity, Proof of Burn, Proof of Capacity, and Proof of Elapsed Time. These 
algorithms ensure that each person on the blockchain is aware of the current global state 
of the chain and any updates that occur. Each consensus method has their own 
advantages and disadvantages but seek to fix issues that stem from Bitcoins blockchain.  
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Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus algorithm allows validators to validate blocks in 
accordance to how many coins they currently hold or “stake” ("Proof of Stake (PoS)", 
2018). Proof of Stake does not contain miners but validators instead, because all the coins 
are already pre-mined with the reward being transaction fees ("Proof of Stake (PoS)", 
2018). To bring down the cost of mining, PoS only allows validators to validate a portion 
of the block in relation to their stake in the blockchain. By only allowing validators to 
validate proportionality their stake, energy consumption decreases. 
Proof of Activity (PoA) seeks to combine the above-mentioned Proof of Work and Proof 
of Stake to solve potential security weaknesses and flaws. One issue that Bitcoin might 
face in the future is that newly minted coins are capped at 21 million (Buchko, 2018). 
While not expected to run out until 2140, the approximately 4 million coins left will be 
the last minted (Buchko, 2018). After all the new coins are mined into circulation, miners 
will no longer receive the reward subsidy that they are currently collecting. Instead of the 
reward, miners will only be awarded transaction fees for verifying and confirming 
transactions. When left with no subsidy, an economic situation such as a tragedy of the 
commons may occur where individuals act in self-interest rather than for the good of all. 
Without subsidies to reward miners, transactions and the network will become less stable 
which impacts security (Buchko, 2018). PoA uses PoW initially by continuing to have 
miners solve mathematical formulas until a block is mined. The block will not contain 
any data in relations to transactions but will contain a header with the winning mining 
node (Bentov, Lee, Mizrahi & Rosenfeld, 2014). After the header is updated with the 
winning miners address, PoS chooses the validator to complete the block. With PoS, the 
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validator with the most coins has a better chance to sign and verify the block that came 
from the PoW miner. 
Proof of Burn (PoB) is an interesting consensus algorithm that is not currently being used 
in any full-time project. In this method, miners “give” coins to the blockchain address to 
show that they have committed their coins to the system. Burning coins gives the “miner” 
the ability to participate in randomly selected to mining the next block (Castor, 2017). By 
using computational resources instead of computational power, energy use is decreased at 
the expense of wasting coins on being allowed to participate in the random block 
selection lottery.  
Proof of Capacity (PoC) also known as Proof of Space, is a consensus algorithm designed 
for low energy consumption and is currently used in only one blockchain. PoC uses hard 
drive memory space instead of expensive equipment to store “plots” on the user’s system 
(Dziembowski, 2015). These Plots are generated as a nonce, which includes hashed data 
combined with the ID of the computer. The more plots or nonce a user has, the more 
likely they will get chosen to win the right to create the next block. Higher memory space 
in a computer also increases the chances of a user winning the right and claiming the 
reward for the next block. The main argument for this consensus method is that everyone 
has free space in their memory and by accessing and using it for plots, energy 
consumption would decrease dramatically (Dziembowski, 2015). 
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) is the chosen consensus algorithm for this thesis as it is 
native to Hyperledger Sawtooth’s environment. Hyperledger Sawtooth uses a “trusted 
execution environment” that improves on current solutions to the Byzantine Generals 
problem discussed before. The benefits of using a PoET consensus method includes 
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fairness, investment, and verification ("PoET 1.0 Specification", 2018). Fairness is 
achieved by distributing the execution “election” process to all nodes to ensure each node 
gets a chance to participate. Investment refers to the total cost of execution proportional 
to the value gained from the execution. And finally, verification methods are in place to 
ensure all nodes can declare that the winner of the execution achieved it legitimately. 
High electricity usage in PoET is therefore not an issue because of the Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE). The TEE requires no extra work to be done by the computers 
hosting the nodes like Bitcoins PoW requires. 
Each consensus algorithm brings something new to blockchain technology, but often 
while one issue is fixed, another one arises. For example, while PoS solves the electricity 
usage problem Bitcoin will face in the future, it brings an issue of security. A flaw in PoS 
is that if an adversary acquires 51% of the circulation of coins, the consensus algorithm 
will continue to reward them as the majority stakeholder. The algorithm works by giving 
the most reward to the highest coin holder and could easily be manipulated. While 
unlikely that a single individual could own 51% of the blockchain without any notice in 
the market, it is still a potential flaw that PoW and PoET don’t have. Furthermore, 
consensus methods such as Proof of Burn and Proof of Capacity waste unnecessary 
resources on validating blocks to solve the energy usage issues. PoET is therefore the 
perfect consensus algorithm for this thesis because the permission based environment 
filters out common issues with a public blockchain.  
3.3 Blockchain Security 
The security of using blockchain as a platform is important to consider when looking into 
real world implementation. Security benefits achieved with the blockchain developed in 
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this thesis include data integrity, signature verification, and a permission based network 
architecture. To highlight the benefits of the blockchain, Bitcoin is used as a comparison 
because of its history with being secure since its inception. A threat model is also 
presented. 
3.3.1 Data Integrity 
Data integrity is achieved with the use of hashing data in the blockchain. By using 
hashes, the blockchain can be verified to not have been tampered with or altered. Bitcoin 
and our blockchain use two similar but different methods of hashing data. The process of 
hashing refers to “any function that takes input of some length and compresses them into 
short, fixed length outputs” (Katz & Lindell, 2008). Each block in the blockchain 
computes a hash value into what is called a digest. The digest relays proof to the user that 
the data in the block is secure and the integrity remains valid. If unauthorized 
modification to the block occurred, the digest value would change producing an error on 
the blockchain.  
There are numerous types of hashing algorithms but only a few are approved for use in 
secure cryptography because of their properties. Approved hash functions are required to 
be collision resistant, have pre-image resistance, and have a second pre-image resistance 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015). Collision resistant refers to the ability of the 
algorithm to create different outputs from the same inputs of value m and m1. If the 
outputs of m and m1 were the same, an attacker could run the hash algorithm to find the 
value of the hashed message. Next, the pre-image resistance property ensures that the 
hash algorithm is a one-way function and an adversary could not reverse the hash digest. 
Lastly, a second pre-image resistance property is also required which makes “it 
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computationally infeasible to find a second input that has the same hash value as any 
other specified input” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015). 
Hashing algorithms that implement the above properties were approved by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) called the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) to 
be used in secure cryptography (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015). From the SHS, 
Secured Hash Algorithms (SHA) were specified which include SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2015). While each algorithm achieves different objectives and are used in 
various use cases, they all achieve the same three properties outlined by the NIST. For 
comparison, Bitcoin uses SHA-256 while our blockchain uses SHA-512. The differences 
can be highlighted in the use cases that each platform uses hashing for. Bitcoin uses 
SHA-256 to create the Proof of Work algorithm and to create the users’ addresses while 
the SAMR blockchain uses SHA-512 to hash the contents in the batch to verify they have 
been unmodified. However, the structure of SHA-256 and SHA-512 are largely identical 
with differences in the computation of the message digest. Table 1 below shows the 
different properties of SHA-256 and SHA 512.  
Algorithm Message Size Block Size Word Size Digest Size 
SHA-256 264 512 32 256 
SHA-512 2128 1024 64 512 
Table 1: Hash Algorithm Properties 
As the above table shows, SHA-512 effectively doubles in size the parameters used to 
create the digest. A small benefit gained from using each algorithm is the speed of 
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processing with 32-bit and 64-bit software respectively (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2015). 
3.3.2 Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures are used in the blockchain by the actors to ensure newly created blocks 
are authorized and legitimate. By using digital signatures, an extra layer of security is 
achieved in addition to the hashes generated by the SHA-512 algorithm. Two techniques 
for creating digital signatures exist: symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods. In 
symmetric encryption, a single private-key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. It is 
a fast way to communicate information but is susceptible to being broken if the single 
key used is leaked or acquired. In comparison, the blockchain uses asymmetric 
encryption techniques called public key encryption which is used to communicate 
information without the need to discuss secret information beforehand. The operation of 
generating both public and private key is slower but allows it to be used for digital 
signatures to provide authentication and integrity verification. Furthermore, only the 
private key needs to be kept secure for the scheme to work, as the public key can be 
known to all. Public key encryption works by “allowing a signer S who has established a 
public key pk to sign a message using the associated private key sk in such a way that 
anyone who knows pk (and knows that this public key was established by S) can verify 
that the message originated from S and was not modified in transit” (Katz & Lindell, 
2008). To create the public key pair, a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm is used. 
The blockchain uses an approved method to create the signatures as outlined in the 
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) published by the NIST. A variant of the Digital 
Signature Algorithm (DSA) mentioned in the DSS is used called the Elliptical Curve 
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Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015). This 
variant of DSS uses elliptical curve cryptography along with secure parameters to 
generate secure public and private key pairs. The algorithm used are outlined in the 
Standards for Efficient Cryptography which provide elliptic curve domain parameters. 
The parameter used is called the secp256k1 which creates a 512-bit key pair for use in the 
blockchain. ECDSA and its parameters have been proven secure as long as the Random 
Number Generation (RNG) implementation has been followed correctly (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2015). In comparison, Bitcoin uses the same digital signature 
scheme that has proven secure from its launch in 2008. 
The blockchain first digitally signs the block with sk on the transaction header block and 
then verifies that the public key associated with the actor is legitimate. Signatures are 
then used to authenticate the identity of the actors in the blockchain during the process of 
submitting a transaction for validation. Validators will only submit changes to the global 
state of the blockchain if the signatures are valid when transactions are submitted. By 
using digital signatures, the blockchain doubles its security layer in combination with 
hashes by authenticating the transactions from actors. 
3.3.3 Access Control 
Access control in blockchains vary depending on the use case and development process 
but must be considered during the development phase. The blockchain presented in this 
thesis uses a permission based network and system because it was designed to be 
implemented as an enterprise application. Blockchains such as Bitcoin are considered 
public blockchains because anyone can use their service to create and receive transactions 
of the cryptocurrency. 
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Being permission based allows the system administrator to establish roles with actors in 
the blockchain. The system administrator who globally sets up the blockchain for all 
parties is responsible for implementing access control in the system. For the scope of this 
thesis, the system administrator was run from the same virtual machine as the blockchain 
network and actors resided on. The limited actors in the blockchain enable it to keep it 
internally secure through authentication and authorization processes. Authentication 
layers previously discussed are used to ensure that only authorized actors are submitting 
transactions. Validators in the network are also permission based by the system 
administrator on a case by case basis. To be added to the network as a node the system 
administrator must do their due diligence to confirm that the repair station or government 
entity needs the required permissions. For example, the FAA and NTSB were added as 
actors because of their requirement to audit maintenance records at any given time. For 
the scope of this thesis, only a few nodes for the simulation were set up and established. 
Two certified repair stations were authorized for submitting transactions through the local 
network form with read and write permissions to create and view transactions. The FAA 
and NTSB were the government agencies chosen to perform audits on the blockchain 
with only read permission of the blocks. All actors except the aircraft owner or operator 
can be used by the consensus algorithm to execute and publish a blockchain. The aircraft 
owner or operator does not have a node in which to validate transactions. They just use a 
digital signature to sign off on the Certified Repair Station (CRS) work. A table of the 
actors’ permissions can be found in Table 2 below. The simulation section of the paper 
further elaborates on the scenario for the actors. 
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Actor # of 
Nodes 
Read 
permission 
Write 
permission 
Validate 
Permission 
CRS 2 Y Y Y 
Owner/Operator 1 N N Y 
FAA 1 Y N Y 
NTSB 1 Y N Y 
Table 2: Actor Permissions 
3.3.4 Threat Model 
Throughout the development of the blockchain, a threat model was used to discover 
potential weaknesses in the code and design. The threat model chosen is STRIDE which 
was developed by Microsoft in an effort for developers to start thinking about threats 
early in the application life cycle ("The STRIDE Threat Model", n.d.). STRIDE is an 
easy to remember acronym with every letter representing a different threat category. The 
definition, potential attacker vectors, and countermeasures are discussed below. 
Spoofing Identity: The act of spoofing refers to an adversary using the identity of an 
authorized user to illegally access resources on a system where they would normally not 
have access to. In the blockchain, spoofing could occur during the transaction submission 
phase where an adversary could steal the login information of the front-end form. 
However, dual layer security in the form of digital signatures and hashing functions make 
it improbable that an adversary could submit transactions. The digital signatures verify 
that the user is who they say they are through authentication, and then authorizes them to 
use the submit button which would be the resource. 
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Tampering with Data: An adversary in this threat category would try to alter or modify 
any data either when it is stored or when it is in the process of transferring. The 
blockchain uses hashing algorithms to secure the payload during the transfer of 
transaction to the blockchain. The adversary would not be able to alter the data in the 
payload without the system knowing that the integrity of the file has been tampered with 
or modified. The Journal class would then give an error back to the submitter of the 
transaction with the proper response. Furthermore, the storage of the approved 
transaction in the blockchain cannot be altered as the original block is used to generate 
the hash of the future blocks that are added to the blockchain. If an adversary tried to alter 
a previous block the blockchain integrity would be compromised and the system 
administrator could revert the global state of the blockchain to before the attack. For a 
block to be changed, an authorized user would have to fill out a request form and submit 
it to the system administrator to change the block. The change would be noted on the 
previous block, but the old data would remain on the record and would contain a change 
link to the new data. 
Repudiation: This category involves a user or attacker who leverages the inability of a 
system to track invalid actions and uses them to gain some advantage in the system. No 
threats are seen from this category in the blockchain because each section is as self-
contained as possible. Proper error and response messages are also displayed for various 
failures.  
Information Disclosure: Involves the leak or access of information with an individual 
who is not supposed to have access to it. The permission based system in the blockchain 
architecture does not allow for anyone in the public to view the blockchain. Digital 
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signatures are verified before the blockchain can be accessed and then double checked 
when a block ID is pulled. An adversary with no access to the system would not be able 
to pass through any layers. The information stored in the blockchain is also not seen as 
being valuable enough for this attack to occur in the general aviation industry. 
Denial of Service: A Denial of Service (DoS) attack refers to an adversary flooding the 
network to disrupt the service of users.  Protocols are built into Hyperledger Sawtooths 
backend platform to prevent DoS attacks. Such protocols include limiting the number of 
incoming transactions (can be scaled to fit future needs) and by limiting the size of the 
payload to a reasonable number of bits. 
Elevation of privilege: An adversary would want to gain access to systems without 
having the proper access through a compromised system. The only authority responsible 
for establishing access roles would be the system administrator responsible for adding 
actors to their roles. There is no other attack vector other than the system administrator 
assigning roles into the system for elevation of privilege. 
By having used the STRIDE threat model to develop the blockchain, attacker vectors 
were limited as much as possible. Countermeasures such as dual layer authentication and 
data integrity were implemented based on the output of the threat model. 
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Chapter 4  
4.0 Development 
The development of the blockchain occurred over a twelve-week period and consisted of 
over 300 hours of work. Initial topic research was conducted to understand the 
Hyperledger Sawtooth platform and how it could be leveraged for this thesis. 
Development of the blockchain took the longest amount of time because of the 
interacting parts of the code. Python was used to connect the REST API, blockchain 
architecture, blockchain logic, and the environment. Further testing of the blockchain 
included the validator network, consensus algorithm and REST API. Finally, the 
simulation was created by adding actors and attributes to display a working blockchain. A 
further breakdown of the hours spent on the blockchain can be found in Table 3 below.  
Activity Topic Research Concepts Development Testing Simulation 
Hours 55 30 150 40 25 
Table 3: Blockchain development time log 
4.1 Introductory Concepts 
Knowledge of the architecture of Hyperledger Sawtooth’s environment is first required to 
understand how the blockchain was developed on its platform. These concepts include 
the global state, transactions, validator network, journal, and PoET. 
4.1.1 Global State 
A Global State is needed to begin the structure of the blockchain to ensure that all data is 
being displayed at the same time to each node. To do so, Radix Merkle Trees are used to 
store data in a single instance to ensure that each block has the same information for the 
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present and is updated in the future. By using the Merkle Trees, the blockchain ensures 
that the data from the maintenance records are stored securely and efficiently.  
The Merkle Tree generates a single root hash which points to the current version (state) 
of the data. The root hash is then placed on the block header where consensus on the 
expected version of state along with the consensus of the chain of blocks is given ("PoET 
1.0 Specification", 2018). The nodes or leaves of the Merkle Tree are considered one 
block in the blockchain which represents an addition or change to the maintenance 
records of an aircraft. Figure 3 below gives a visual representation of the Merkle Hash 
Tree process.  
 
Figure 3: Merkle Hash Tree Example 
To change the state of the Merkle Tree, a five-step process must be completed presented 
in Figure 4. First, a transaction must be submitted via a client through the REST API into 
the blockchain. Next, the transaction is wrapped in a batch which passes the transaction 
batch to the validator network. The validators will then ensure that all attributes and 
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digital signatures passed security and serialization requirements. The transaction batch 
will then store the data in the leaf nodes to be serialized into a byte array defined as a 35-
byte addresses. The new root hash will be recalculated, and the root hash value will 
update the global state.  
 
Figure 4: Global State Change Process 
4.1.2 Transactions 
To change the global state of the blockchain, transactions are submitted and temporarily 
added to the Merkle Tree as a leaf. The transaction is the submitted maintenance record 
uploaded via the front-end form and submitted to the blockchain through the REST-API 
client. The transaction contains the digital signatures of the actors, along with the 
submitted maintenance record data. For a transaction to pass to the validators, it must be 
wrapped and submitted in a transaction batch. 
The transaction batch is a combination of either multiple transactions or as few as one. 
Batches are treated equally and are submitted for validation in the order they are created. 
It is important to note that at this stage, transactions may be valid or invalid and could be 
Transaction 
Submitted
Wrapped 
as a Batch
Submitted 
to 
Validators
Transaction 
Processes 
Global 
State 
Change
 
 
32 
 
denied if all attributes are not completed. If one transaction in a batch fails to validate, the 
entire batch will fail to commit. The transactions would have to be submitted again after 
fixing the errors presented in the terminal. The leaf and subsequent change to the top hash 
is not committed until validation is successful. The below UML Diagram (Figure 5) 
shows the structure of the batches and transactions.    
 
Figure 5: Batches architecture (From Sawtooth.Hyperledger.org) 
The data from the batch and transactions are serialized into secure headers to sign the 
submitted batches. Using the digital signature security algorithms discussed in the 
security section of this paper, the private keys sign the non-serialized transaction and 
batches. The headers are then verified using the public keys of the actors to ensure the 
exact bytes match the transaction signature ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). The payloads 
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of the transactions are verified using the payload_512 filed which contains a hashed value 
of the data ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). This process uses the SHA-512 hashing 
algorithm discussed in the security section of this thesis. Batches are an important part of 
transactions because without them the order of transactions could not be controlled. By 
using transaction_ids in the batch field, the blockchain can solve the problem by 
committing the transactions in the order they were submitted. 
Transactions families may also be created which group together transactions that are alike 
in several aspects including attributes and identity. Transaction families can allow for 
easier use of uploading large batches of Maintenance Records from the same location.  
For example, a transaction family can be created for a certified repair station and all 
batches may be submitted at once at the end of a day cycle. By using repeated elements 
of the attribute list, transactions can be batched together. Figure 6 below shows an 
example attribute list that could create a transaction family. In this case, the family 
created would be for the Certified Repair Station ‘Embry-Riddle’. 
 
Figure 6: Transaction Attribute Example 
4.1.3 Validator  
Transaction validators apply blocks that allow the change of the Global State to occur. 
After a batch is submitted via a http web client or mobile app, the validators will check if 
the transactions in the batch are valid. The transaction validator will apply the change if 
all the attributes in the transaction batches are complete. If any attribute is not included, 
$ var cessna172 = {id: ‘0001’, owner: ‘Ahrash’, 
location: {Certified Repair Station: ‘Embry-
Riddle’, city: ‘Daytona Beach’, state: ‘Florida’}, 
date: ‘2018021’} 
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the Global State and the Merkle Tree will not update. Figure 7 visualizes the interaction 
between the HTTP Client and the validators. A new transaction batch will be uploaded 
via HTTP / Mobile API Client and then validated by the validator to return either an 
updated global state or invalid transaction to the users’ client. The HTTP Client can be 
used to check ID’s of approved blocks to the blockchain when the global state updates.  
 
Figure 7: Validator Network Interacting with HTTP Client 
The logic that is used to run the validator in the blockchain are called transaction 
processors. Each node runs a transaction processor that is used to process incoming 
transactions submitted by the user clients ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018).  For our 
blockchain, the transaction processor was modified to take in the aircraft payload, state, 
and ID. For transactions to operate on the network, nodes are used to interact with the 
blockchain and update the network’s state. Each organization that is a part of the 
blockchain runs its own authorized node on their computer to contribute to a consensus or 
agreements on the blockchain. Communication is essential over the network between 
validators and incoming transactions which is why Sawtooth’s network was designed to 
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be as self-contained as possible ("Introduction – Sawtooth”, 2018). Validators listen on 
assigned ports for transactions incoming for validation. 
From Hyperledger.org, each node runs the following three processes: 
 The main validator process: Works with the Journal to complete transaction 
handling, block management, consensus, state updates, and the P2P network.  
 The REST service: Listens for requests on a dedicated and port for transactions 
from authorized HTTP clients.  
 Transaction processor(s); Runs one or more processor to enter logic into the 
validator and Journal. 
Figure 8 below gives a visual representation of the three node processes running together. 
A local front-end form will interact with the REST API to push a transaction batch to the 
validator. After other nodes compete for the process of execution on the P2P network, the 
winning node will complete the blockchain with the help of the transaction processor 
logic.  
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Figure 8: Node Process 
After the node approves the transaction batch through the validators transaction 
processors, the block can now be added to the blockchain. Sawtooth uses a Journal 
comprised of multiple subprocesses to extend the blockchain.  
4.1.4 Journal 
The Journal class works with the validators to processes blocks and batches through 
different “pipelines”. Together, all the subprocesses form a system that can process 
batches and transactions which are verified through the different dependencies. While the 
Journal class is flexible enough to run a multitude of consensus algorithm, Proof of 
Elapsed Time is being used to allow it to be asynchronous. The asynchronous nature of 
the Journal “allows incoming blocks to be processed in parallel by the ChainController, 
as well as allowing the BlockPublisher to proceed with claiming blocks even when the 
incoming block rate is high” ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). The benefits of PoET also 
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outweighed any other consensus algorithm for this thesis. A visual representation of the 
Journal pipeline and internal workings is shown below in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Journal Pipeline (Figure modified from Sawtooth.Hyperledger.org) 
The Journal begins with the BlockStore class which is responsible for storing the current 
blocks on the blockchain all the way to the first genesis block. Multiple classes including 
the validators rely on the BlockStore class to hold the current record of the blockchain. 
All blocks in the BlockStore are officially completed and are accessed by the Batch ID, 
Transaction ID, or by block number ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). Errors that can occur 
in this class have proven non-recoverable and fatal which is why it is imperative that each 
check class does the proper job to only ensure proper transactions are validated.  
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The BlockCache stores and keeps track of all validator blocks and their current states. 
The three states that a validator block can be in are valid, invalid, or unknown ("Journal – 
Sawtooth”, 2018). Each time the blockchain is started, a new cache is created because it 
is a temporary in-memory construct. Blocks in the cache are not lost and only keep 
relevant in use blocks for ease of lookup in its memory. For example, a block that is 
looked up in the BlockStore will be entered into the BlockCache for the current session. 
After the session, the BlockCache will periodically purge the blocks to keep itself 
relevant and free of space. 
The Completer class ensures that all batches and transactions are valid before they are 
sent further down the pipeline. It analyzes the block headers and attributes to ensure 
nothing is left blank that could cause an error in the subsequent block classes. 
Dependencies are also analyzed, and blocks can timeout if subsequent blocks are not 
found in the response window.  
The BlockPublisher class is responsible for extending and adding to the blockchain after 
the proper checks have been conducted. The BlockPublisher follows the consensus 
algorithm that is used in the blockchain, in this case it will be using the PoET consensus 
algorithm. Each state of the logic flow allows for the validation of the block compared 
with the consensus algorithm ("PoET 1.0 Specification", 2018). The process begins with 
the class checking if it has a block that is a candidate for publishing to the blockchain. If 
it does have a block it will check if it is scheduled and authorized to push the block into 
the scheduler. The scheduler will then push the batch for verification and validation to be 
finally added to the head of the blockchain. If a block is not present it will attempt to 
create one that will later be added to the batch. A visual representation of the 
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BlockPublisher logic class is found below in Figure 10 taken from the open-sourced 
documentation of Hyperledger.org.  
 
Figure 10: BlockPublisher logic flow (From Hyperledger.org) 
The ChainController class is responsible for seeing which state the validator is on and 
applying the necessary state changes. When a block is pushed to the chain controller, it 
creates a BlockValidator which uses a thread pool for execution ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 
2018). The BlockValidator is only found in the ChainController class and is responsible 
for block validation and fork resolution ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). The 
BlockValidator will then determine if it is a valid or invalid block. If the block is valid, it 
will add it to the chain head and update using the BlockPublisher class in the consensus 
interface. If the block is invalid, it will not become the chain head and the state will not 
update. A visual representation of this process is found in Figure 11 taken from the open-
sourced documentation of Hyperledger.org. 
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Figure 11: ChainController block flow (From Hyperledger.org) 
The final part of the Journal is the consensus class, which is comprised of three interfaces 
which are the Consensus.BlockVerifier, Consensus.ForkResolver, and 
Consensus.BlockPublisher. These three classes combined provide for the Proof of 
Elapsed Time consensus algorithm to run. While different consensus methods can be 
used, PoET is native to Hyperledger Sawtooth and was chosen for this implementation. 
Figure 12 below shows the interface of the consensus class that runs PoET.  
 
Figure 12: Consensus Interface Classes 
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The Consensus.BlockPublisher class is only given access to read permission on the 
global state, what is currently on the BlockStore ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). Along 
with the view permissions, it has permission to push completed batches for publication on 
the blockchain. This class is also necessary for the creation of the genesis block when the 
blockchain is first created. The three events that occur Consensus.BlockPublisher are 
initialize_block, check_publish_block, and finalize_block. 
Consensus.BlockVerifier provides Block verification services to the BlockValidator 
("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). This class provides an additional check to the blockchain 
by ensuring the proposed new block meets consensus publishing rules. 
Finally, Consensus.ForkResolver handles any issues related to forks in the blockchain. A 
fork in any blockchain refers to the change in protocol that all nodes must change to still 
be valid ("Journal – Sawtooth”, 2018). For example, if a critical error in the original 
blockchain or a substantial software upgrade is made to the system, the old blockchain 
will not accept block extensions. Instead of extending the older blockchain, a new 
blockchain is created parallel to the old one to follow the new rules and protocols set 
forth by the developer. While the old blockchain information will still be there, any 
transactions submitted to it will be considered invalid and must be published to the new 
blockchain. While forks occur regularly in a public non-permission based blockchain 
such as the Ethereum network, we do not see the blockchain presented in this thesis being 
forked at any time. Nevertheless, the Consensus.ForkResolver is responsible for carrying 
out the change to the blockchain in the rare case of a fork. A visual representation of a 
blockchain fork can be found below in Figure 13. The diagram demonstrates blocks that 
are on the old blockchain that have forked to the new forked protocol blockchain.  
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Figure 13: Blockchain Fork Example 
4.1.5 Proof of Elapsed Time Consensus Method 
As discussed previously, Sawtooth uses a Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) consensus 
method ("PoET 1.0 Specification", 2018).  that solves the Byzantine Generals problem. 
The Trusted Execution Environment uses a random lottery mathematical function that 
chooses an individual peer to execute requests at a given rate ("PoET 1.0 Specification", 
2018). The peer that “wins” the right to execute is chosen after individual peers each 
sample an exponentially distributed random variable and waits for a given amount of 
time given by the sample ("PoET 1.0 Specification", 2018). The peer with the smallest 
sample wins the execution. An example of the TEE flow process is shown below ("PoET 
1.0 Specification", 2018). 
1. Each node on the network requests a wait time from a trusted function which 
provides confidentiality and integrity. 
2. The “leader” or execution validator (node) is chosen by the shortest wait time for 
a specific transaction block. 
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3. A function in this case “CreateTimer” issues a timer for a transaction block that is 
guaranteed to have been created in confidentiality and integrity. 
4. Finally, a check function such as “CheckTimer” is used to verify the validator did 
indeed wait the time that it used to claim the leader role.  
The introductory concepts discussed in this section were used to provide basic 
background on how the elements of the blockchain connected to each other. Aviation 
Maintenance Records have many requirements that must be achieved through the 
creation of a ledger based blockchain. The initial research done on the first linked 
blockchain by Haber and Stornetta led to the creation of Bitcoin which was the first 
documented paper that brought together multiple algorithmic ideas. From Bitcoin, other 
technology such as Hyperledger emerged to create a ledger based blockchain that could 
serve enterprise applications. Finally, the architecture discussed gives a high-level 
understanding of the elements of the ledger based blockchain. The next section goes more 
in detail on the technical side of the blockchain and its elements.  
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4.2 Environment  
4.2.1 Development process 
Figure 14 below gives a visual representation of the high level blockchain development 
process. First, we defined our actors and assets that would operate on the blockchain in 
order to assign roles. After the roles were established, a transaction template was created 
for the actors to enter and fulfill their roles in the blockchain to acquire all necessary data 
to be stored in the ledger. Then, after all information was acquired, the logic for how the 
blockchain would operate was developed parallel to the existing development 
environment of Hyperledger Sawtooth. A validator network was then created to accept or 
decline transactions based on developed logic. If the validator network approves the 
blocks, the global state will update and the blockchain will be extended.  
 
Figure 14: High Level Blockchain Development Process 
The required actors in the blockchain are the aircraft owner and aircraft mechanic. The 
official part supplier information can be omitted if no parts are changed on the aircraft. A 
scenario that this could occur in, would be scheduled required inspections on an aircraft 
Define actors
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in good condition that needs no modifications. The auditing parties have read only 
permission only after the Certified Repair Station has made their own audits on the 
blockchain. The FAA periodically inspects CRS and Fixed Based Operators (FBO) to 
audit their logbooks to search for any abnormalities. As discussed previously, the FAA 
takes a serious stance on any fraud or misconducted when it comes to Aviation 
Maintenance Records. Being able to provide audibility and transparency is a large part of 
this thesis and is achieved in several ways by allowing audits to be made on the 
blockchain. 
4.2.2 Development 
An open sourced copy of Ubuntu version 16.04 is used to install the Python SDK for 
Hyperledger Sawtooth. Along with Ubuntu, Python version 3.5 was installed as the 
development language for the blockchain. The blockchain and application development 
process was completed using the Python programming language, as it is native to 
Hyperledger Sawtooth. Other programming languages such as Go, Java, Javascript, and 
C++ were considered but did not have the level of stability and support as Python did. 
To contain the program and help package the different classes responsible for running the 
blockchain the open sourced program Docker Engine and Docker Compose were also 
used. The Docker Compose Tool is installed to run multiple applications within one 
docker engine instance. An example of the multiple processes being run are the REST 
API and Sawtooth blockchain interacting with each other when adding a block to the 
blockchain.  
To construct the Hyperledger blockchain environment in docker, a sample .yaml file was 
modified. The modified file named docker-compose.yaml holds startup settings for the 
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blockchain which include a validator, REST API, and transactions processors. The 
interaction of these functions can be seen below in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15: Docker .yaml functions 
The REST API was established on TCP port 8008 which accepts submissions from the 
Front-End form created using Flask. The transactions are then submitted to the validator 
which actively listen for incoming messages on TPC port 4004. The validator will then 
work with the transaction processor logic to either approve or deny the transaction. The 
settings for the blockchain were left on default to achieve the benefits of the introductory 
concepts. Each process and the port they were established on can be found in the three 
figured below (Figures 16-18).  
 
Figure 16:  REST API in docker-compose.yaml 
 
Figure 17: Validator in docker-compose.yaml 
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Figure 18: Blockchain settings in docker-compose.yaml 
 After the docker environment was set-up and verified to be running, the code for the 
blockchain was developed in the aircrafts-sawtooth container.  
4.2.3 Blockchain Code 
The logic behind the blockchain resides in the Aircraft package created in Hyperledger 
Sawtooth. The classes consist of AircraftPayload, AircraftState, 
AircraftsTransactionHandler and the main Transaction Handler. A UML diagram of the 
classes can be found below in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Sawtooth Logic UML Diagram 
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The logic classes roles and responsibilities are discussed below: 
 AircraftPayload: The aircraft payload contains information regarding the family 
specific attributes of the maintenance record. For example, the location of the 
CRS and the aircraft ID will be included in the payload to show transaction 
processors that it belongs to a specific transaction family. The payload is hashed 
using SHA-512 and verified by comparing the payload header and the payload 
bytes. Deserialization of the payload will occur by the transaction processor that 
matches the transaction family. Classes that view the payload can only see the 
payload bytes and not the content inside.  
 AircraftState: The aircraft state is responsible for storing the hashed headers of 
the submitted transactions. This class is used to verify the integrity of the files in 
the later processes. The headers can be used to get_aircraft if the user possesses 
an aircraft_id. 
 AircraftsTransactionHandler: The main logic for the transaction processors 
resides in this class. It is used in conjunction with the main transaction handler 
class to verify transactions. The data from the front-end form is used to create 
transaction families. The attributes are then verified to be valid and the transaction 
is created. From here, the transaction is passed to the second handler class.  
 TransactionHandler: The second part to the transaction processor, this class is 
responsible for connecting to the validators located on port 4004. The transaction 
from the AircraftsTransactionHandler is pushed to the validator which uses the 
journal subprocesses to add the block to the blockchain. An error will be returned 
if the validators fail to add the transaction.  
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In addition to the Aircraft package folder, a dedicated package was created for Flask 
which enables the front-end form to be created. Flask was chosen to host the local web 
page because for the scope of this thesis there is no need for a direct web hosted 
framework. Flask is considered a micro framework because of its limited abilities to not 
require libraries (Flask, 2018).   
The classes of this folder are app.py and sawtooth_client.py. The data is parsed using a 
JSON data format which interacts with the REST API in the sawtooth_client.py class. 
The template for the web form is stored in the app.py folder also. Together, these two 
classes enable the user to enter in a transaction and submit it to the transaction. Due to 
permission requirements of the blockchain, the private key is unique for each web client 
and will sign the transaction when it is submitted. All classes and a copy of the virtual 
machine used to develop the blockchain can be found in the appendix section.  
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4.3 Simulation 
4.3.1 Scenario 
Our scenario involves Charlie who is the owner of a 2015 Cessna 172S with aircraft 
registration number N12345. Charlie operates his aircraft out of a small general aviation 
airport in San Jose, CA at Reid-Hillview airport. Charlie regularly flies his aircraft and 
gets inspection done at the onsite repair station of a local Fixed-Based Operator (FBO) 
named Aero Aviation. While the FBO has only done physical log book entries in the past, 
a new prototype blockchain application has begun testing at their CRS. Charlie has begun 
noticing that the door on his Cessna has started to vibrate midflight and wants his long 
time mechanic Mike at Aero Aviation to inspect the aircraft. Speaking to Mike, Charlie 
was interested in trying out the new blockchain to make his maintenance record log 
books more secure.  
During the inspection, Mike finds that a bolt on the door needs to be replaced and needs 
to be ordered from a part supplier. Knowing that the blockchain records all order history, 
Mike goes with a slightly more expensive but official supplier for the Cessna 172 door 
bolt. Mike then enters the date, the aircraft make and model, Aircraft identification code, 
aircraft owner name, mechanic name, authorized repair station name/location, description 
of maintenance, and the part order history into his front-end form. A copy of the front end 
form is found below in Figure 21. 
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Figure 20: Mike entering attributes into front end form 
At this point, the repair is complete, and Charlie comes to inspect his aircraft. Mike will 
then click the create button which will digitally sign his mechanic signature to the 
transaction. After Mike digitally signs and clicks submit, the block transaction will be 
pushed to the blockchain for verification using the REST-API. Since all entry fields are 
filled out, and the integrity of the signatures has passed, the maintenance record for the 
repair has been added to the blockchain. 
The events that take place in the blockchain are seen in the snapshot below (Figure 22).  
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Figure 21: Successful entry of the block into the blockchain 
The validators listening on port 4004 picked up a push request from the REST-API. After 
verifying that the digital signatures are registered and approved to submit on the 
blockchain the block publisher subprocess in the Journal claims the block. The chain 
controller in the Journal class then receives the block and starts the block validation. The 
request is then sent to the handler where it is approved to be added to the blockchain. The 
chain head is then updated and the blockchain is extended. A block ID number is then 
presented to Mike and Charlie to easily look up and reference in the future (Figure 23). 
  
Figure 22: List of block ID’s 
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The FAA regularly audits Aero Aviation to ensure that they are compliant with recording 
aviation maintenance records. The FAA requests permission to view the block ID in 
which Aero Aviation gives them. The FAA can then view the block and the information 
that was entered by the mechanic. With all attributes and digital signatures verified, the 
FAA can give approval to the FBO to continue its operations. The lookup function 
returns the data in the block in its serialized form. From this block, the auditors will click 
the link to be directed to the REST-API which will desacralize the data and show the 
contents of the blockchain. The lookup function returns the information shown in Figure 
24 below. JSON String texts are stored on the system administrators’ server which is 
linked directly to the block ID. When requesting information from a block, a link is 
provided which redirects the user to the local host page that shows the data in a readable 
format shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 23: Lookup Block ID of completed transaction 
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Figure 24: Deseralized data from the REST-API 
  
 
 
55 
 
Chapter 5 
5.0 Results and Recommendations 
5.1 Results 
This thesis proposed and developed a secure and transparent blockchain that solves 
multiple issues currently plaguing the aviation industry. All security and transparency 
issues that this thesis set out to solve were completed along with proving that it is a viable 
solution for implementation. 
Security was a high priority in the blockchain which was why SHA-512 and digital 
signatures were implemented to allow for multiple checks in the transaction flow. While 
SHA-512 might have been unnecessary because SHA-256 has yet to be broken, it 
demonstrates that the blockchain is ready to be scaled for future implementations. Digital 
signatures that verify the integrity of the submitters of transactions were also important to 
close any attack vectors found when implementing the STRIDE threat model. 
Transparency was achieved by using retrieving blocks from the blockchain to conduct 
audits. CRS and FBO can audit their own blocks before telling the FAA that they can 
come and audit their maintenance record logbooks. FAA audits are made easier and are 
less time consuming when requesting transactions from one location. Part tracking will 
also cut down on any fraud occurring from the installation of non-official aircraft parts. 
By entering the order and/or tracking number into the blockchain, auditors can verify that 
the part was ordered as said by the mechanic.  
In addition to security and transparency, all FAA requirements for a maintenance 
logbook were achieved by the below implementations: 
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 Record Continuity: The blockchain achieves continuity by having a reliable 
network of nodes that store the global state in Radix Merkle Trees. In the rare 
event of a complete network crash or attack, the nodes will continue to store the 
latest global state offline and will be restored when brought online again.  
Furthermore, the system administrator automatically keeps copies of all global 
states in case a global state rollback is required.  
 Includes Required Contents: All entry fields on the digital form were taken 
directly from a physical maintenance record with additional fields including the 
part tracking and part supplier. The fields can be modified for future use.  
 Ability to Add New Content: Being a digital ledger gives the blockchain the 
ability to continue growing and storing information indefinitely. The head of the 
blockchain is continuously updated as blocks are added to the system and the 
global state is updated.  
 Provides Entry for Signatures: Digital signatures are substituted for physical 
signatures to provide an extra layer of security for the blockchain. The 
authentication and integrity of transactions was a high priority and was achieved.  
By developing and verifying that all FAA requirements were met, the blockchain 
developed in this thesis is currently a viable method for storing aircraft maintenance 
records.  
5.2 Recommendations 
The blockchain developed in this thesis was a prototype to demonstrate that the use case 
was valid for the technology. The results concluded that blockchain technology is a 
viable solution to fixing current aircraft maintenance records. However, future 
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implementation will require the blockchain to be scaled to meet industry needs. 
Scalability can be achieved through the development of more nodes and a full 
application. Nodes can be added to the network to increase execution time and take on an 
increase in transaction network load. For a node to be authorized, the system 
administrator will need to create an application in which valid actors would apply and be 
authorized to use the system. A node program will then be installed on their computer to 
assist in creating a larger node network. A full application can also be developed for iOS 
and Android devices to facilitate an easier environment for mechanics and FAA officials 
to complete their responsibilities. For example, a retrieval tool could be created which 
simply sorts by maintenance facility to easily locate all transactions submitted by that 
location. The REST API used in this blockchain could also be used in the creation of the 
future application.  
In addition to scalability, other use cases for blockchain technology exist including the 
below business sectors: 
 ADS-B: The registration of aircrafts with ADS-B technology could be stored on a 
blockchain and be verified when needed without the use of servers.  
 UAV Registry: The FAA could store UAV registration numbers and subsequent 
data in a blockchain as an alternative to currently storing the information on 
servers.  
 Airline Tickets: Airlines could assign tickets a block on a blockchain which 
could then be resold by either travel agencies or individuals. The tickets would be 
a tradable asset such as crypto currency and could provide a new product offering 
for an airline.    
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 Airline Rewards: By developing a crypto currency to operate within the 
blockchain, airlines could reward their customers with coins instead of loyalty 
points. The coins could then either be sold on worldwide exchanges or used to 
trade goods without being constricted to one airline.  
The development of this thesis combined technologies such as blockchain, cryptography, 
coding and networking. Together, these technologies make a Secure Aviation 
Maintenance Record Blockchain that is a viable alternative to the physical ledger. 
Blockchain has come a long way, and through the continuous development and use of the 
technology, it can move many industries into the 21st century.  
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